Anthracite smuggling: who profits from coal exports from seized mines

Despite sanctions restrictions, anthracite from the occupied Luhansk region continues to find its way to international markets. This process involves Russian forwarding companies, criminal structures, as well as firms from Turkey, Montenegro, and Hong Kong. This entire operation is only part of a large-scale shadow logistics closely linked to the Russian president’s entourage—the Farvater. Shikhod’s investigation provides detailed information on how anthracite ends up in foreign banks, who receive profits from smuggling, and the role of the Mariupol port in these schemes.

Anthracite from mines located in the temporarily occupied territories continues its journey along the global route despite the restrictions imposed. The primary component of this scheme is Russian logistics, which facilitates the transfer of money from illicit trade to legitimate accounts in international banks, spanning countries from Rovaniemi to Hong Kong, via Turkey and the Balkans.

Despite the negative impact of the war, anthracite mining continues. The coal is transported to the port of Mariupol, from where it is shipped outside the occupied regions.

Coal from Rovenki to Montenegro

In April, more than 1,100 tons of anthracite, worth more than 6 million rubles, were shipped via the Donetsk Railway. The payment is to be made by a little-known Moscow company, and the final buyer turned out to be a company from Montenegro, with a destination in Turkey.

Our investigators followed the further movement of funds. The financing was to be carried out by a suspicious business called “Aeps Ich Ve Dysh Tyjaret Limited Shirketi Branch”, registered in Moscow in 2024. However, this company does not appear in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities with the specified details.

Montenegrin forwarding company

The recipient of the anthracite was Rovenkiv Fuel and Energy Company Almaznaya LLC, a rebranded Ukrainian company, Ukrgart, which was legalized in Russia after the occupation. The Montenegrin buyer — Northwork — turned out to be a typical forwarding company, registered at an address with no active contacts and an empty balance sheet. However, we found Kateryna Pisarenko by email address.

This email led to another company, Mir Global & Co, registered on the same day and at the same address as Northwork. Formally, Turkish citizen Ali Yilmaz heads it, and Pisarenko is his deputy.

The woman is a Russian citizen from Rostov and previously managed the Delfin coal company. The structures associated with Pisarenko demonstrate the connections of Russian capital through regional firms.

Criminal connection and port director

One of the critical people in this scheme is Oleg Kharlamov, a member of the Rostov criminal group known as the “Zavar pirates”, who has specialized in maritime transportation for years. His accomplice, Alexander Soldatov, is currently the director of the Mariupol port, through which coal is shipped.

Shadow network and Kremlin traders

The investigation led to the company Nika Trade Invest LLC, which began to control the main cargo flows through Mariupol after Soldatov’s arrival. Despite its small capital, it quickly became a powerful player in the region.

There are suggestions that this company has connections with representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense. At the same time, one of its partners is Green Rabbit Ltd from Hong Kong, which until recently was headed by Muslim Temerkayev, a well-known advisor to the Kabayev family.

Although Temerkayev denies his involvement in the business, the documents indicate his connections with coal, emphasizing that behind the illegal schemes are not only business interests, but also a structure close to the highest political leadership of Russia.

Illegal coal circulation despite sanctions

The shadowy circulation of coal from the occupied Luhansk region continues despite sanctions. The schemes involve fictitious companies, invalid agents, and other fake structures. All this operates under the cover of Russian officials and criminal elements.

The primary income does not go to the restoration of territories or salaries to miners, but into the pockets of those close to the Kremlin. This shows that cooperation with international sanctions without effective control is just a formality.